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1 Introduction
Since the inception of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), a great deal of research
has been devoted to investigating its impact on the degree of nancial integration.
By analyzing the Eurozone nancial integration, the literature unequivocally maintained the
tendency of the Eurozone countries to disproportionately invest in their partners compared to other
countries, both for bilateral bond holdings (Lane (2006), Giofré (2013)), and for bilateral equity
holdings (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), Balta and Delgado (2009), Berkel (2004), Slavov (2009)).
Sousa and Lochard (2011). Allen and Song (2005) conrm a similar evidence for cross-border direct
investments and cross-border merger and acquisition activities.
Over more than 20 years, the EMU has been challenged by events, which potentially could have
jeopardized the integration process. Two are the major suspects, deagrating almost contempora-
neously: the EMU enlargement process and the nancial crises, i.e., the 2007 global nancial crisis
followed by the European sovereign debt crisis.
Since the extant literature suggests that the e¤ect of a common currency can di¤er across coun-
tries, the inclusion of new members in the monetary union might have signicantly tilted the existing
equilibria in the area. Lane (2008) shows that the EMU e¤ect is greater for those countries char-
acterized by a less-developed nancial system. Giofré (2012) demonstrates how the single currency
seems to have promoted a quicker nancial convergence among EMU members, as countries very
distant before the adoption of the euro have been the fastest to converge. More specically related
to the enlargement process, Baltzer et al. (2008) point out that the new members had a much lower
level of integration, but, since their entry in the EU, they have also started a reverse trend. Dunis
et al. (2013) show that the integration process seems to be di¤erent for each country, more visible
from the entrance in the EU, and less clear after the adoption of the euro. Masten et al. (2008)
expect the nancial integration of those new members to become faster after the adoption of the
single currency. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017) conrm, relative to xed securities markets, that
the new members of the Euro area have increased their level of integration with the others EMU
members.
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On the other hand, there is a lively debate on the consequences of global events, such as nancial
crises, on the process of nancial integration. Hartmann et al. (2004) and Brière et al. (2012),
consider the changes in nancial markets due to the e¤ects of globalization. Longsta¤ (2010) shows
in his study the contagion e¤ect of subprime CDOs on other nancial markets, and Vermeulen
(2013) proves a negative relationship between foreign equity holdings and stock market correlations
during the nancial crisis. Brière et al. (2013) and Lane (2013) conrm a general decrease in total
investments and a collapse in capital ows in crisis periods. Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) specify
that the nancial crisis hit mostly the advanced economies featuring a higher level of nancial
integration, and less the emerging economies.
Within the evidence of a general downfall of international nancial ows documented by the
literature (Lane (2013), Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011)), this paper brings to light that after 2007
bilateral cross-border portfolio equity holdings within the EMU area fell more abruptly and per-
sistently than for other country-pairs. Due to the contemporaneous incidence of global shocks and
Euro area-specic events, this peculiar evidence can be the result of the crises and/or the enlarge-
ment process. Moreover, both the nancial crises and the enlargement process are consistent with
long lasting e¤ects: on the one hand, the nancial crisis persisted in the European landscape turning
into the sovereign debt crisis, and, on the other hand, the enlargement process has lasted for several
years, with the progressive entry of new members.
Therefore, any of the two explanations nancial crises or enlargement , or any combination
of the two, can be recognized as responsible of the abrupt and persistent decline in stock market
integration among EMU member countries.
To properly assess the role of these two main events, we scrutinize the dynamics of di¤erent
members, i.e., the original EMU members and the new ones.
Our ndings highlight that the crisis has drastically weakened the linkages among original mem-
bers: a peculiar decline in economic development and, more importantly, a deterioration of the
control of corruption standards of Euro periphery countries, those more severely injured in the sov-
ereign debt crisis, induced a sharp decrease of their inward investments by the Euro area as a whole.
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Furthermore, the inclusion of countries with lower economic development and institutional standards
than the original members has not helped the cohesion within the enlarged EMU area: while new
members have mildly increased their portfolio holdings in the old EMU countries, their equities have
been exerting a low nancial attractiveness upon old members.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we sketch the estimable
equation. In Section 3 we describe the data and discuss some descriptive statistics. In Section 4,
we perform the empirical analysis and discuss the main results. In Section 5, we provide a tentative
assessment of the relative role of the crisis and the enlargement process in shaping the evolution of
the EMUs bilateral foreign portfolio equities. In Section 6, we try to interpret the evidence in the
light of the di¤erent role of size and institutions over time and across countries. Section 7 analyzes
the investment patterns of Euro core and periphery countries. Section 8 summarizes and concludes.
2 Estimable equation
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The dependent variable log(FPEsh), is the logarithm of the foreign portfolio equities (FPE) of
source country s in host country h.
Our regression specication accounts for pair-specic regressors (Zsh or Wsh), such as gravity
variables, country-specic variables (Xh; Ys; Qh, Ts), such as size and institutional variables, and
time factors (D).
Among these covariates, continuous regressors (Qh, Ts and Wsh) are expressed in logarithmic
terms, so that their coe¢ cients, being the dependent variable also dened in logs, can be easily
1Our data are time varying, but for the sake of simplicity in notation, we drop the time index in the equations.
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interpreted in elasticity terms (e.g., if a signicant coe¢ cient is equal to 0.3, then a 10% increase in the
regressor induces a 3% increase in the dependent variable). Conversely, the e¤ect of a dichotomous
variable (Xh; Ys and Zsh) on a dependent variable expressed in logs is captured by the following
transformation of its coe¢ cients : e   1 (e.g., if a signicant coe¢ cient  is equal to 0.3, then the
e¤ect of a dummy equal to 1 on the dependent variable is e0:3   1 = 0:35; to be interpreted as the
e¤ect being 35% larger than the e¤ect of a dummy equal to 0).2
Among these variables, the dummies capturing the EMU country membership are crucial for our
analysis. EMUsh is a bilateral-specic dummy variable taking value 1 when both the source country
s and the host country h are EMU members, 0 otherwise; EMUs (or EMUh) is instead a country-
specic dummy variable equal to 1 when the source country (or host country) is a EMU member, 0
otherwise.
Finally, D is a dummy capturing the time dimension in terms of years or, more meaningful for
our purposes, in terms of occurrence of peculiar events, such as periods of crisis, which allows us to
detect any global shift in foreign investment due to macroeconomic shocks.
To investigate the dynamics of integration of bilateral FPE in the euro area, the econometric
specication (1) is enriched throughout the analysis to include interactions with the EMU dummies,
so as to seize the eventual incremental or erosive role played by other factors (A), such as the crisis,
on the EMU linkages.3
log(FPEsh) = + EMU + A+ EMU  A+ controls+ "sh (2)
Through a Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence approach, we aim at seizing how a factor A; e.g., the crisis
variable, a¤ects FPE among EMU countries, on top of the global e¤ect played by A on FPE.
The econometric strategy adopted follows Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) who explicitly ad-
dress, within the standard trade log gravity models, the problem of ination of zero investment
2Note that if the coe¢ cient is null (or non statistically signicant) then e0 1 = 0, i.e., the e¤ect of a dummy equal
to 1 is equal to the e¤ect of a dummy equal to 0.
3The subscript "" indicates sh; s or h, when the EMU dummy is, respectively, bilateral, source country-specic
or host country-specic.
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data and the need to get estimates robust to di¤erent patterns of heteroskedasticity.4 Accordingly,
we model the dependent variable FPEsh as following a Poisson distribution, applying the Poisson
Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimator with individual xed e¤ect that in our case corresponds to
country-pair xed e¤ectsand standard errors clustered by year.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 Data
We consider the bilateral equity portfolio investments of 68 countries, for the period 2001-2017.5
We adopt the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), released by the IMF, a dataset
which has been used in many recent papers (Fidora et al. (2007); Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007);
Sorensen et al. (2007); Giannetti and Koskinen (2010); Giofré (2013)). This survey collects security-
level data from the major custodians and large end-investors. Portfolio investment is broken down
by instrument (equity or debt) and residence of issuer, the latter providing information on the
destination of portfolio investment. While the CPIS provides the most comprehensive survey of
international portfolio investment holdings, it is still subject to a number of important caveats.6 The
most important is that the CPIS is unable to address the issue of third-country holdings and round-
tripping, very frequent in the case of nancial o¤shore centers. Following the more recent literature on
o¤shore center classications, we exclude from our sample "the eight major pass-through economies
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Hong Kong SAR, the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, the Cayman
Islands, Ireland, and Singapore [hosting] more than 85 percent of the worlds investment in special
4Since the seminal works of Tinbergen (1962) and Linnemann (1966), the gravity models, originally formulated in
multiplicative form, have been extensively applied using the log-linearised form to estimate the parameter of factors
predicting regional patterns of trade, foreign direct investment, and, more recently, foreign portfolio investment.
Although the problem of obtaining consistent estimates of the conditional mean of the dependent variable when the
model is estimated in the log linear form was already known (Goldberger (1968); Manning and Mullahy (2001)),
the gravity literature seems to have neglected the issue until the work by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). As a
solution, these authors proposed the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator, which is consistent in the presence
of heteroskedasticity, and also provides a natural way to deal with zero values of the dependent variable.
5See Appendix A for the full list of investing and destination countries.
6See data.imf.org/cpis, for more details on the survey.
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purpose entities, which are often set up for tax reasons" (Damgaard et al. (2018)).7
Details on the denition of the dependent variable and regressors, and information on their
respective sources, are reported in Appendix A.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports the variables included in our analysis and their main descriptive statistics. The
subscript sh refers to the country-pair, and  indicates that the corresponding variable enters the
analysis for both the destination and the investing country.
[Table 1]
The rst panel reports data on the dependent variable, i.e., the bilateral portfolio equities holdings
expressed in US$. They range from 0 to 1295 billions of US$, with a median of 8.10 millions and a
standard deviation of 29 billions.8
The second panel groups the size variables, such as GDP per capita, GDP in US$, and stock
market capitalization. The analysis of GDP per capita of source and host countries points out a
large dispersion among countries. On average, the GDP per capita is 24327 US$, while 50% of the
sample has a GDP per capita lower than 16681 US$. The minimum value is equal to 447 US$, while
the maximum is 119225 US$, with a standard deviation of 21977 US$. A notable degree dispersion
is also present for the GDP in US$ and market capitalization.
In the third panel, we group all the bilateral gravity variables: with the only exception of the
distance variable, these are dummy variables expressing whether or not country pairs share a border,
colonial linkages, a common language, or legal origins.
7In Table 4 (and 4A in Appendix B), we also consider alternative stricter classications, which consider a larger
number of destination economies as o¤shore centers.
8As reported by the IMF, in some cases within the CPIS, negative values are reported for the value of residents
holdings of securities issued by a particular economy. Such entries reect short positions in securities, usually resulting
from the sale of securities acquired under repurchase agreements. In our sample, the number of negative positions is
very low (74 out of about 50 thousands of observations) and so is their absolute value, therefore, we exclude them
from the sample.
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The fourth panel shows the values of the capital mobility variable, with a rank ranging from 0
to 10 to indicate increasing levels of capital mobility, and with an average equal to 4.48. The rst
quartile of the countries is equal to 1.54, while the third quartile reports a ranking equal to 6.92.
Finally, the last panel reports the institutional variables, such as "control of corruption", "rule of
law", "government e¤ectiveness" and "regulatory quality" drawn from the Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGI, World Bank), and the "perceived control of corruption" (Transparency Interna-
tional).9 These variablesrank goes from 0 to 100, reecting an increasing country governance index.
For instance, countriesmean rank for the "control of corruption" index is around 68.74, only 25% of
countries report a result lower than 51.38, while another 25% are ranked over 91.20, with a standard
deviation equal to 25.40.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Preliminary evidence
In Figure 1, we report the dynamics of FPE. Panel a) displays the staggered entrance of new members
in the EMU, and the pre-crisis, crises, and post-crises time spans. Bilateral portfolio equities (FPE)
are regressed on the bilateral EMUsh dummy, year dummies D, and their interaction EMUsh  D,
to seize the change in the impact of the EMUsh dummy on FPE over time:
log(FPEsh) = + EMUsh + D + EMUsh D + "sh (3)
[Figure 1]
Normalizing to 1 the e¤ect of the common currency in 2001, Figure 1 displays the trend of the
EMU e¤ect on bilateral portfolio foreign investments. The changes over time in foreign portfolio
equity investment (FPE) from the original 2001 value are signicantly di¤erent from zero. We can
observe, rst, that over the whole period we can record a positive role of the common currency on
9These indexes are described in Section 6.2 and in Appendix A.
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cross-border portfolio investment; second, there has been a decreasing EMU e¤ect from 2007 onward;
nally, there has been no recovery, but rather a slow decline down to 40 percent of its initial level.
Since 2001 to 2017, the occurrance of global shocks might have shifted cross-border foreign in-
vestments for all countries. Panel b) of Figure 1 reports the trend of bilateral foreign investment
over years for all countries in the sample, estimated as follows:
log(FPEsh) = + D + "sh (4)
After normalizing to 1 its average value in 2001, the gure displays an increasing pattern of FPE
in the world until 2007, a drop in 2008 and then a recovery up to a level more than 3 times larger
than its initial level. The drop in this gure reects for equity holdings the abrupt fall in nancial
ows due to the nancial crisis recorded by the literature (Lane (2013); Milesi-Ferretti and Tille
(2011)).
By comparing panel a) and b) of Figure 1, we notice that, similarly to the global trend, also
EMU countries show a signicant drop in reciprocal cross-border investment, but di¤erently from
the global trend, this pattern has not reversed after the crisis. This suggests that Euro area specic
dynamics can be responsible of the persistence in the decline of FPE among member countries.
In panel c) and d) of Figure 1, we scrutinize the role played by EMUmember countries as investing
(EMUs, panel c)), or as recipient economies (EMUh, panel d)) on bilateral FPE, normalized at their
2001 value, and its trend over time.
The two graphs contribute to show the relatively poor performance of EMU countries relative
to the world, since 2007 onwards, both as investing and as recipient economies: we observe a sharp
decline with the crisis, and then a slow persistent decrease towards a signicantly lower level than in
2001. On average EMU countries have become less performing as investing economies, and even less
attractive as host economies. To fully understand what has driven these results, we need to seize
the role of the two main events that involved the EMU countries: the nancial crisis, followed by
the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area (crisis e¤ect), and the enlargement process (enlargement




4.2.1 The dynamics of EMU linkages
Table 2 shows the e¤ect of the bilateral EMU dummy, EMUsh, on bilateral foreign portfolio equity
holdings. The dependent variable is the log of bilateral foreign equity investment (FPE). Regressors
are reported at the head of the rows. As specied above, the coe¢ cients of all regressors expressed
in logs can be interpreted in elasticity terms, while the e¤ect of dummy variables on the dependent
variable is captured by the coe¢ cient  as follows: e   1.
In column 1, we include standard gravity variables, used in literature to dene the cultural and
geographic proximity between two countries for equity ows (Portes and Rey (2005); Portes et al.
(2001)), and equity holdings (Chan et al. (2005)). In our case, we include among the gravity variables,
the distance between the capital cities of country s and country h, the border dummy (equal to 1
for each country pair sharing a common border, 0 otherwise), the language dummy (equal to 1 when
the country s and the country h share the same language, 0 otherwise), the colonial dummy (equal
to 1 for those pairs of countries sharing a common colonial past, 0 otherwise), and the legal origin
dummy variable (equal to 1 when investor and destination countries have a common legal origin,
0 otherwise). We expect geographical and cultural proximity to have a positive impact on foreign
portfolio equities, as a decrease in physical and cultural distance reduces information costs, and then
enhances investment by foreign investors.
Consistently with the gravity model approach, we also include the size variables that express the
economic weight of the investing and host countries, such as market capitalization and GDP per
capita, and nally we control for capital mobility.
[Table 2]
The results, as predicted, show that the gravity variables have a strong impact on the FPE
allocation. The distance variable displays a negative coe¢ cient (-0.064), meaning that an increase in
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distance between capital cities is associated with a decrease in foreign portfolio equities.10 Sharing
a common border leads to an increase of FPE by 46% (e0:378   1=0.46), having an o¢ cial language
in common increases FPE by 83%, having a common colonial past increases equities share by 4.6
times, while the common legal origin seems to marginally decrease FPE by 4% (e 0:046   1= 0:04).
The contribution of the size variables also appears important. Stock market capitalization has a
signicant and positive impact on the FPE, which appears to be stronger for the host (0.771) than
for the source country (0.571). The opposite happens to the GDP per capita variable: an increase in
the source countrys GDP strongly fosters foreign investment, with a much lower e¤ect for the host
countries. Capital mobility variables play a non signicant role on the investing size, and a modest
negative impact on the host side.
The coe¢ cient of the bilateral EMU dummy variable over the whole period is equal to 0.563, that
is EMU countries invest one another 76% more than other country-pairs.
In column (2) of Table 2, we try to capture the time variation of the EMU dummy, by identifying
the nancial crisis (2008-2009) and the post-nancial crisis period (2010-2017). The coe¢ cient of
the crisis dummy (non signicant) and of post-nancial crisis dummy (marginally positive), capture
the impact of these two periods on bilateral FPE of non-EMU country pairs. We observe that the
coe¢ cient of the EMUsh dummy, referred to the excluded time span, i.e., the pre-nancial crisis
period, is large, positive and statistically signicant: EMU members used to invest one another
106% more than non-EMU country pairs in the pre-crisis period. The e¤ects of the EMU dummy
in the subsequent periods are computed by adding the coe¢ cients of the corresponding interaction
terms to the non-interacted one.
The negative coe¢ cient of the interaction term EMUsh  Financial crisis can be interpreted as
the change of the EMU e¤ect (on FPE) induced by the crisis (or, symmetrically, as the change of
the crisis e¤ect on FPE for EMU country pairs). It is negative and signicant, thus suggesting a
10Di¤erently from standard gravity models in the trade literature, we include also country-pair xed e¤ects, in order
to properly seize the EMU e¤ect on FPE. Since the e¤ect Australia-Argentina is xed over time, but di¤ers from the
e¤ect Argentina-Australia, the coe¢ cient of the distance variable (equal for country pair, regardless of which is the
investing or destination economy) can be estimated. The relative small size of the coe¢ cient of the distance is then
due to the fact that it captures the e¤ect on FPE, on top of the pair-country xed e¤ect.
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signicant drop (from 106% to 74%) in the EMU e¤ect on FPE relative to the pre-crisis period (or,
symmetrically, a more negative e¤ect of the crisis for EMU country pairs). The negative coe¢ cient
of the interaction between the EMU dummy and the post-nancial crisis period shows a further drop
compared to the nancial crisis period, with an EMU e¤ect shrinking to 63%.
After the global nancial crisis, the Europe has been awed by another violent crisis, the European
sovereign debt crisis (2010-2012). In column (3) of Table 2, we consider both crises together, and
the post-crises period since 2013 onwards.
We observe a large drop in FPE among the source and host countries of the euro area during
the crises period (nancial and sovereign debt crises) from 105% to 61%, with only a very marginal
recovery after the crises. As far as non-EMU country pairs are considered, instead, the coe¢ cient of
the crises period is non signicant, while the positive signicant coe¢ cient for the post crises period
highlights the general recovery after the crisis outside the eurozone.
The results in Table 2 conrm, in a multivariate setting, the preliminary evidence of Section 4.1:
after 2007, the common currency e¤ect on bilateral FPE has signicantly fallen, and therefore the
linkages among EMU countries have signicantly loosened. The fall in the EMU e¤ect can be due
a to a slackening of the linkages among the original members because of the crisis, and/or to the
inclusion of new countries more loosely connected with the euro area. To better understand the
phenomenon, we need to scrutinize within the aggregate euro area, to identify the di¤erent dynamics
over time, and across sub-groups.
4.2.2 Group decomposition of EMU
In Table 3, we restrict to OLD EMU countries, the original members: the within-OLD EMU invest-
ments (i.e., the foreign holdings among original EMU members), keeping constant the composition
of the EMU group, help isolate the e¤ect of the crisis. A comparison of the investment within-OLD
EMU with the dynamics of investment between OLD-EMU and the whole EMU group (new and
old), will allow us to detect the role of the enlargement. In fact, it is impossible to investigate the
investment dynamics (in pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis) of NEW EMU countries as a separate
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group, because they started entering the EMU group since 2007 onward. We try to circumvent this
problem by observing the investment patterns of OLD EMU over time, and then the investment
patterns of the whole EMU group, made up of OLD EMU only countries until 2007, but including
also NEW EMU thereafter, as far as they enter the common currency area. By comparing these two
patterns, we will try to infer indirectly the role played by the enlargement, on top of the crisis.
[Table 3]
In Table 3, we decompose the EMU foreign investment focusing rst on the within-OLD EMU
group (columns (1a) and (1b)), then on the outward foreign investment of OLD EMU in EMU
(columns (2a) and (2b)), and nally on the inward foreign investment of OLD EMU by EMU countries
(columns (3a) and (3b)). The columns (#a) and (#b) consider specications, respectively, without
and with interactions with crisis and post-crisis dummy.
From column (1a) of Table 3, we observe that the foreign investment within OLD EMU countries
is, on the whole time span, more than 77 percent larger than all other bilateral holdings. This e¤ect
has been severely awed by the crisis: in column (1b), we observe that, belonging to the original
EMU group, used to induce 106% larger investment, which dropped to a 62% e¤ect during the crisis
and slightly recovered to a 69% after the crisis. These ndings suggest a decisive role of the crisis in
loosening the linkages among original EMU countries: in fact, even keeping constant the composition
of the EMU group, the role of the common currency has drastically shrunk after the crisis.
To detect the contribution of the enlargement, we observe the investment of the OLD EMU
countries in the whole Euro area and compare it with the behavior observed within the OLD EMU
group. Column (2a) shows that on whole time span OLD EMU countries investment in EMU
economies is 76 percent larger than other bilateral holdings, a gure very close to the one in column
(1a). The results in column (2b) show that the change of investment of OLD EMU in the EMU group
is almost identical to the one recorded among OLD EMU (column (1b)). While the almost identical
gure in the pre-crisis period is predictable, since the EMU group in the pre-crisis period coincides
with OLD EMU, with the only exception of Slovenia entering the union in 2007, the identical pattern
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during and after the crisis is far from obvious.11
Columns (3a) and (3b) show the investment of the EMU economy in OLD EMU: the 76 percent
higher average impact on investment (column (3a)), is the result of a dynamic pattern very close to
the one observed among OLD EMU in column (2b). If the enlargement had signicantly contributed
to the shrinkage of linkages among EMU countries, we should observe a stronger decrease in the
investment of OLD EMU in EMU (and of EMU in OLD EMU) than within the OLD EMU sub-
group: since it is not the case, the evidence suggests that the lions share of the drop is attributable
to the crisis.
4.2.3 Robustness
To provide further consistency to these ndings, in Table 4, we undergo our main results to a
robustness check on the sample of countries.
[Table 4]
For the ease of comparability, we report, in columns (1) to (4) of Table 4, the main ndings
underlined above. In column (1), we report the results of column (3) of Table 2, while columns (2),
(3) and (4) of Table 4 replicate columns (1b), (2b) and (3b) of Table 3.
Columns (5) to (8) of Table 4 report results under a di¤erent classications of o¤shore nancial
centers: we enlarge the list of o¤shore centers to other EMU countries, such as Cyprus, Malta and
Belgium, following the classication in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017).
In Table 4A, in Appendix B, columns (1) to (4) follow instead a previous classication, which,
among EMU countries, excludes from the o¤shore list the Netherlands, but adds Cyprus, Latvia
and Malta (Zoromé (2007)).12 Finally, columns (5) to (8) account for an alternative specication
of the crisis period, starting from 2007, rather than from 2008. This nal check plays a two-fold
role: on the one hand, it represents a sensitivity check on the dates of the crisis; on the other hand,
being the enlargement process kicked o¤ by Slovenia in 2007, the redenition of the pre-crisis period
11Actually Slovenia, though entering the union in 2007, is present in the CPIS dataset as investing country only
since 2008 onwards (while it is present as destination economy also in previous years).
12For a detailed list of o¤shore centers in the di¤erent specications, see Appendix A.
14
as 2001-2006, allows the pre-crisis and the pre-enlargement period to coincide, and then to better
isolate the role of the NEW EMU entrance on FPE holdings by OLD EMU.
We nd that, under di¤erent denition of o¤shore centers and under a redenition of the crisis
periods, the results, though di¤erent in size, conrm the baseline specications ones: the enlargement
seems not to have majorly contributed to worsen the linkages in the Euro area.
5 The role of crisis and enlargement
The above-discussed results seem to suggest that the crisis and its lasting aftermaths are the main
responsible of the drop of bilateral FPE in the Euro area. In Table 5, we summarize the quantitative
assessment of this shrinkage.
[Table 5]
The gures in Table 5 are computed from Tables 4 and 4A (Appendix B). The rst panel refers
to the baseline specication in Table 4 (columns (1) to (4)), the second to the alternative o¤shore
center specication in Table 4 (columns (5) to (8)), while the third and fourth panel are based on
the robustness specications in Table 4A.
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 5 form the block (a), and report the marginal e¤ect of the common
currency on bilateral FPE, in the pre-crisis period, during the crisis and after the crisis. The marginal
e¤ect, in percentage terms, is obtained as follows: (e 1) 100, where  is the coe¢ cient reported in
Tables 4/4A. As an illustrative example, we take the rst row of the rst panel. Column (1) of Table
4 reports a coe¢ cient of the EMUsh in the excluded period, i.e., the pre-crisis period, equal to 0.719.
Since the dependent variable is dened in log terms, this coe¢ cient implies that countries that are
members of the EMU invest one another 105% more than other countries (e0:719   1 = 1:05).13 In
crisis period, the coe¢ cient of the EMU dummy is equal to the coe¢ cient of the interaction term plus
the coe¢ cient of the EMU dummy in the excluded period, i.e., 0.474 (=0.719-0.245), and the e¤ect
13A coe¢ cient of EMUsh equal to 0 (non statistically signicant), implies an e¤ect on bilateral FPE equal to
(e0   1)  100 = 0: EMU members invest each other exactly like other countries, meaning no EMU e¤ect. Negative
coe¢ cients imply an e¤ect lower than 1, that is, EMU countries invest less than other countries.
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on FPE is e0:474   1 = 0:61, that is, EMU countries during the crisis invest one another 61% more
than other countries. Finally, in the post-crisis period the 0.512 coe¢ cient translates into a 67%
(e0:512  1 = 0:67) higher investment of EMU countries relative to other countries. The second, third
and fourth row of the same panel, report the e¤ect of the common currency (as shown in columns
(2) to (4) of Table 4), restricting to OLD EMU investing in OLD EMU, OLD EMU investing in all
EMU, and all EMU investing in OLD EMU, respectively.
This block (a) of Table 5 provides a consistent picture of the evolution of the e¤ects of the common
currency on FPE, regardless of the specication considered: the currency e¤ect on bilateral FPE has
signicantly decreased after the crisis period and has not signicantly recovered after the crisis.
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 5 form the block (b), and report the variation (in %) of the EMU
e¤ect in the crisis and post-crisis, relative to the pre-crisis period. For instance, the rst line of the
(b) block shows that the bilateral FPE among EMU members has fallen by 42% ((61%-105%)/105%)
in the crisis period and by 36% in the post-crisis period. This block (b) provides a picture of the
evolution over time of the EMU linkage in the whole EMU group (rst row), and in its sub-groups
(second, third, and fourth rows).
Interestingly, though the level of the coe¢ cients, and consequently the e¤ects on FPE, may di¤er
across di¤erent specications (block (a)), the percentages in block (b) of Table 5 are instead very
similar in size and pattern across the four panels.
We observe, rst, that across di¤erent specications, the drop in the EMU e¤ect is not di¤erent
from the drop within OLD EMU countries. Second, the size of the drop is around 40%. Third, the
magnitude of the drop in the post-crisis period is not signicantly di¤erent from the one in the crisis
period.
These ndings suggest the following: the signicant drop in integration in the Euro area has been
triggered by the crisis, whose e¤ects are large and persistent. The evidence that both the size of the
coe¢ cients (block (a) of Table 5) and their change (block (b) of Table 5) among OLD EMU are not
di¤erent from the ones between OLD EMU and all EMU, and the ones about all EMU countries,
just underlines that the contribution of the NEW EMU to the large EMU group is still marginal,
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and that the enlargement has not worsened the fall, but has not alleviated it either.
Does it imply that the enlargement has played no role at all in the integration of foreign portfolio
investments the Euro area?
[Table 6]
The regression estimates in Table 6 investigate the investment patterns of the NEW EMU coun-
tries, i.e., those countries acquiring the status of new EMU members after joining the union.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 6, we investigate the role of the common currency in shaping
the FPE between NEW EMU and the whole group of EMU countries. We observe that NEW EMU
countries invest in the whole euro area 47% less than other country pairs (e 0:634 1 =  0:47; column
(1)), and that receive 24% lower investment from the whole euro area (column (2)).
When considering separately the two groups, NEW EMU and OLD EMU, we observe that NEW
EMU invest in OLD EMU countries 49 percent less than other country pairs (e 0:680   1 =  0:49,
column (3)) and OLD EMU invest in NEW EMU 27 percent less than other country pairs (column
(4)). The evidence that the cross group investments are even lower than the corresponding holdings
for the whole euro area, suggests that the investments among NEW EMU must be instead larger, as
the average inward or outwardEMU holdings improve when including them. Indeed, the investment
among NEW EMU countries are about 1.65 times larger than other country pairs (column (5)).
While we can control for the role of the crisis and post-crisis periods on FPE (as we do in Table
6), we are not able to apply the standard Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence approach to NEW EMU (through
the interaction with crisis and post crisis dummies), because NEW EMU were not NEW EMU before
the crisis.
We can, nevertheless, draw useful information from observing the evolution of the investment
patterns of the "New countries", that is, those countries joining the union after the enlargement
process, regardless of the timing of the entrance. This implies that we examine the evolution of
new members inward and outward FPE, from 2001 to 2017, treating symmetrically Slovenia and
Lithuania, though the former joined the union in 2007, while the latter entered in 2015. In particular,
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we are interested in scrutinizing the evolution of their linkages with euro members, the old and the
new ones.
[Table 7]
In Table 7, we consider the inward and outward investment of New countries in the euro area.
The columns (#a) and (#b) consider specications, respectively, without and with interactions with
crisis and post-crisis dummy.
Columns (1a) and (1b) show that on average New countries underweight equities issued by EMU
countries in their portfolios: their bilateral investment in the euro area are in indeed half of other
country pairsFPE (e 0:704   1 =  0:51, column (1a)). Interestingly, this outcome is the result
of a larger negative position before the crisis and a noticeable improvement afterwards (from 78%
lower FPE before the crisis, to 60% lower FPE during the crisis, to 33% lower FPE after the crisis).
Columns (2a) and (2b) show that the euro area countries as a whole also underweight on average
equities issued by New countries, though at a lower extent (30% lower FPE relative to other country
pairs), but this underweighting has not signicantly decreased over time.
Recalling that the enlargement process started in 2007, these ndings suggest an asymmetrical
process of integration of New countries in the euro area after the enlargement: they have increased
their outward investment in the euro area, but not their inward investment from EMU members.
Since the observed average e¤ects could hide di¤erent group-specic dynamics, we consider separately
the investment dynamics among New countries, and between New countries and OLD EMU.
Column (3a) and (3b) show that the bilateral FPE of New countries in OLD EMU are signicantly
lower than other country pairs, but these negative positions have signicantly improved over time:
starting from a heavy negative position (-78%), the linkages improve during and after the crisis, thus
halving the initial disadvantage (-38%).
When considering OLD EMU investing in New countries, we observe that the average e¤ect is
negative (column (4a)) as OLD EMU invest in new countries 30% less than other countries invest one
another, but this e¤ect has neither improved nor worsened over time (column (4b)). These ndings
underline that OLD EMU used to underweight New countries in their foreign portfolios before 2007,
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and that the enlargement process has not improved this situation. Interestingly, the evidence that
OLD EMU have not altered their investments in New countries over time also dispels any doubt on
the hypothesis of diversion of investments from OLD EMU to New countries by OLD EMU during
and after the crisis period.
Finally, in columns (5a) and (5b), we consider the investment pattern among New countries. We
nd that, on average, their linkages are very strong: they invest one another almost 3 times more
than other country pairs (column (5a)), and these strong linkages have remained fairly stable over
time (column (5b)).
From Table 6 and 7, we have learnt the following two insights: rst, OLD EMU and new members
reciprocally underweight the respective equities in their foreign portfolios; second, the linkages among
new members are quite strong. What we specically recognize from the observation of the dynamics
of New countries in Table 7, is a path of integration: the underweighting positions of New countries
in OLD EMU have improved after the enlargement, and the strong linkages among New countries
have not been hurt by the crisis. This evidence conrms for the EMU enlargement and for portfolio
equities markets, the evidence previously documented in the literature relative to UE enlargement
(Baltzer et al. (2008)) and xed securities markets (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017)). However, the
integration path has not been symmetrical, as the OLD EMU kept equally underweighting New
countriesequities also after the enlargement.
From Table 5, we observed that the entrance of new members has not a¤ected the average
linkages among EMU members, as the evolution of the average EMU linkages is almost identical to
the evolution of the linkages among OLD EMU. The negligible impact of the enlargement on the
overall EMU dummy implies that the positive contribution provided by the strong linkages among
New countries has been o¤set by the negative contribution provided by the weak cross-group (OLD
EMU-NEW EMU) linkages. Indeed, New countries underwent a process of integration in the Euro
area by increasing their investments in OLD EMU, but still underweight them; the OLD EMU kept
underweighting New countriesequities in their portfolios, also after the enlargement, by same extent.
In the following section, we investigate which peculiar features of OLD EMU and/or New countries
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might have potentially hindered the integration process.
6 Interpretation of ndings: the role of size and institutions
In this section, we try to interpret the exceptional drop in bilateral investments in the Euro area in
the light of the evolution of EMU countrieskey features, such as economic development and country
governance factors. In Table 8, we report some descriptive statistics of variables capturing economic
and nancial development (Size), and indexes of country governance (Institutions) for EMU
countries, split by OLD and NEW.
We observe that there is an evident cross-sectional di¤erence between OLD EMU and NEW
EMU, both in terms of economic development and in terms of country governance. Relative to the
new entrants, OLD EMU countries show a larger market capitalization, GDP per capita and GDP
(in US$). Similarly, OLD EMU countries also show a better performance in country governance, as
measured by control of corruption (e¤ective or perceived), rule of law, regulation, and government
e¤ectiveness.
On the one hand, the enlargement to countries with lower average economic size and weaker
country governance standards, might explain why the OLD EMU kept underweighting these new
members assets in their portfolios even after the enlargement. On the other hand, the global
nancial crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis in Europe might have contributed to weaken
the integration among the original EMU members, by producing an unprecedented drop in economic
and nancial development, and a serious worsening of country governance and stability.
[Table 8]
6.1 Size
In Table 9, we include the interaction of the EMU dummy with the size variables, to check whether
the change in the economic size of EMU countries can be addressed as responsible of the decline in
bilateral FPE among EMU countries.
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We adopt the Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence strategy implemented so far, and include a regressor equal
to 1 if the economic size of the source/host country is "High", that is, above the median ("H_size"),
and 0 otherwise. While its coe¢ cient provides a measure of the responsiveness of bilateral FPE to the
upper median size of countries for non-EMU country-pairs, the coe¢ cient of the interaction between
the upper median dummy and the EMU dummy captures instead the additional role played by larger
countries on the FPE of EMU country pairs.
The #a columns of Table 9 show the results when considering the interaction of the EMU dummy
with the upper median size of the source country, while the #b columns report the ndings when
the EMU dummy is interacted with the upper median size of the host economies.
Let us consider rst the impact of GDP per capita, a measure of the countrys standard of living.
On the investing side, richer countries seem to invest 5 times more than other countries, but this
e¤ect is not signicantly di¤erent for EMU countries (column (1a)). On the destination side, instead,
we observe that EMU countries above the median in terms of GDP per capita attract 55% more FPE
from other EMU countries, while EMU countries with below the median GDP per capita attract 52
percent lower Euro investment (column (1b)). These ndings are consistent with both a decline in
bilateral FPE in the Euro area due to a decrease in GDP per capita among OLD EMU, and the
inclusion of economically less developed new members.
[Table 9]
Columns (2a) and (2b) of Table 9 show that the size of the investing economy, as measured by
the GDP in US$, plays a general negative role on bilateral FPE, while the size of the destination
economy plays a positive role. While there is no di¤erential impact of the size of the destination
EMU country on the FPE in the euro area (column (2b)), there is a di¤erential impact of the size
of the investing EMU country: if the EMU investing country has a size (GDP US$) below the
median, it invests in other EMU countries 2.5 times more than other country pairs (e1:259 1 = 2:52;
column (2b)), while an investing EMU countries with a upper median GDP US$ invests in EMU
countries only 29% more than other country pairs (e1:259 1:004   1 = 0:29, column (2a)). Finally,
when considering the stock market capitalization as a measure of nancial development, we observe
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that above the median market capitalization of the economies generally induces very large outward
and inward investments (columns (3a) and (3b)). When looking specically to the impact on EMU
countries, we observe that market capitalization adversely a¤ects EMU linkages: EMU countries with
a market capitalization below the median invests one another about 60% more than other country
pairs, while EMU countries with a market capitalization above the median invest one another only
about 35% more. It is worth emphasizing that the dynamics of stock market capitalization are purely
cross-sectional, as we include its (time-invariant) 2001 value in all regressions. Our choice is dictated
by a standard concern of endogeneity, due to the simultaneity between the total supply of stocks and
the level of bilateral investment (demand).
The results about the e¤ect of size on the EMU e¤ect is controversial. The relative to the size
of the economy (GDP in US$) and of its nancial sector (stock market capitalization) suggest that
the EMU e¤ect should be stronger for those member economies relatively smaller. In other words,
the enlargement of the union to smaller countries and/or the eventual contraction in economic and
nancial development of old members should be conducive of larger bilateral FPE in the Euro area.
Conversely, the GDP per capita measure, which is related to the average standard of living, conveys
the opposite message: a lower GDP per capita is associated with lower attractiveness and then lower
FPE in the Euro area.
The evidence of a strong decline in bilateral investment in the Euro area suggests the direction of
the balance of these contrasting forces. If these measures of size have actually inuenced the sensitiv-
ity of the bilateral EMUs FPE, then the strength of GDP per capita must have been prevailing: the
decrease in wealth (GDP per capita) of EMU countries, making them less attractive, has contributed
to reduce bilateral investment in the Euro area; conversely, the decrease in size (GDP in US% $ or
stock market capitalization) of the investing economies, operating in the opposite direction, might
only have partially o¤set the fall in FPE in the euro area.
In Figure 2, we report the dynamics of GDP per capita, the candidate size measure, which,
according to the results in Table 9, has potentially contributed to dampen FPE investment among
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EMU countries.14 In panel a) we represent the evolution of GDP per capita over time for EMU
and OLD EMU, while panel b) shows the evolution for NEW EMU and New countries.15 We recall
that the mean of the latter two groups are di¤erent, because the rst represents the mean for the
countries joining the union as far as they enter (e.g., Lithuania contributes to the mean only since
2015 onwards), while the second represents the mean of all New countries that join the union after
the enlargement, regardless of the time of entry (e.g., Lithuania contributes to the mean since 2001).
[Figure 2]
Graphically, we can appreciate the net separation between OLD and NEW EMU in terms of size
of GDP per capita. The EMU countries show a slow decrease in GDP per capita after the crisis due
to a combination of a at trend of OLD EMU and the inclusion of NEW EMU.
Panel c) displays the trend of the median, rst and third quartiles of EMU countriesGDP per
capita, and the corresponding world quartiles, while the d) panel restricts to OLD EMU countries.
While the world GDP per capita quartiles are never decreasing after 2007, EMU countriesmedian
and rst quartile show a decreasing trend. When comparing this graph with the corresponding OLD
EMUs one, we can observe that the rst quartile still appears slightly decreasing after 2007: even
abstracting from the modied composition of the EMU area, the less rich countries among OLD
EMU seem to have contributed to decrease the average GDP per capita in the EMU area.
To detect any heterogeneity within the group of NEW countries and within the group of OLD
EMU, in panel e) and f), we report, respectively, the dynamics of the GDP per capita of individual
member countries.
Since, the composition of the NEW EMU group is not xed and varies with the entrance of new
members, the way NEW EMU contribute to the EMU average size can depend both on the entrance
of new countries and on the change in the average economic size of the NEW EMU countries already
in. For instance, an increase in the average size of NEW EMU countries in 2009 can be due to an
14Figure 2A in Appendix B reports the same dynamics of Figure 2, but relative to GDP in US$. The dynamics of
stock market capitalization are not reported, because the regressor, to avoid endogeneity, is included in the analysis
at its beginning of period level, as explained above.
15Due to scaling problems, we show di¤erent gures to appreciate the dynamics of New EMU and New countries,
on the one hand, and of OLD members on the other hand.
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increase in the size of Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta (already in), or to the entrance of a larger country
like Slovakia (just entered), or any combination of the two. Due to the low number of NEW EMU,
the dynamic of the average size of the NEW EMU group is quite erratic until 2009, while gets close
to the New countriesand the OLD EMU countriesone, thereafter.
We show in panel e) of Figure 2 that the peaks and drops recorded by NEW EMU in 2008 and
2009 are due to the entrance of new members. In particular, the entrance of Cyprus is responsible
of the abrupt increase in the average size of GDP per capita. Finally, panel f) shows some expected
di¤erences in GDP per capita levels within the OLD EMU group, but does not reveal any noticeable
divergence in trends across countries.16
6.2 Institutions
We now devote our attention to other country characteristics which might have contributed to the
fall in bilateral FPE in the Euro area.
Since fraudulent transactions, bribery, unenforceable contracts, legal and regulation complexity
can signicantly a¤ect portfolio investment (Gelos and Wei (2005); Leuz et al. (2009)), an abrupt
and unprecedented deterioration of country level governance in EMU countries can have contributed
to the collapse of bilateral FPE among EMU countries.
On the one hand, the descriptive statistics in Table 8 reveal that new EMU countries feature sig-
nicantly lower indices of country governance than OLD EMU, so that the enlargement has decreased
the average EMU level. On the other hand, the crisis might have deteriorated the country governance
standards also of OLD EMU countries, thus making the euro area relatively less attractive.
While the contribution of New countriescountry governance to lower the average EMU level is
quite mechanical, as shown by the lower institutional indexes in Table 8, the second point deserves a
deeper investigation. We argue that one plausible channel through which a crisis may a¤ect country
institutions is corruption. The way corruption can lead to a nancial crisis is quite intuitive, as
exemplied by the outburst of the Greek crisis. However, also the opposite direction of causality is
16It is worth underlining that, to check for scaling problems, we have also split the OLD EMU sample in large and
small countries, but we could not detect any peculiarity in the dynamics of OLD EMU.
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possible: a depressed economic environment can indeed be a fertile ground for corruption and bribery.
Melgar et al. (2010), for instance, generally nd that better economic results reduce the perception
of corruption, while the macroeconomic instability and income inequalities have the opposite e¤ect.
Sumah and Mahic (2015), more specically, nd that in the economic crisis, a high unemployment
and low purchasing power are associated with a rising perception of corruption. Ivlevs and Hinks
(2015), by focusing on the change in incidences of bribery in 30 countries in Central Eastern Europe
and Central Asia, investigate the micro-mechanisms lying beyond the association, and nd that
households hit by crisis are more likely to contact and bribe public o¢ cials and, therefore, are more
likely to engage in corrupt transactions. Gugiu and Gugiu (2016) study instead the association
between the economic crisis and corruption in European economies, and nd a structural direct
positive relationship between the economic crisis and perceptions of corruption. Interestingly, the
recent EU Anti-Corruption Report (European Commission (2014)) highlights that those countries
most a¤ected by the economic crisis (e.g., Greece, Italy, Spain, and the Czech Republic), show
particularly severe levels of perceived corruption.
Corruption can represent a serious hinder to foreign portfolio investment. If, in addition, the
connected increase in opacity and transactions costs were particularly relevant for EMU countries,
these factors might have specically injured the integration in the Euro area.
[Table 10]
To test this conjecture, in Table 10, we run a regression which includes a corruption index as a
regressor. We adopt the Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence strategy implemented so far, and include a regressor
equal to 1 if the quality of the institutions in the source/host country is "High", that is, above the
median ("H_institution"), and 0 otherwise. The #a columns of Table 10 report the interaction of
the EMU dummy with the source countriesupper indices, while the #b columns report the interac-
tion with the host countriesones. The rst index, in columns 1a) and 1b), is "Control of Corruption"
drawn fromWorldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, Source: World Bank), and captures the percep-
tions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. As an alternative, in columns
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2a) and 2b), we consider the "Perceived Control of Corruption index" (Source: Transparency Inter-
national), which captures the perceived level of corruption in the public sector, relying on di¤erent
country sources. Finally, in columns 3a) and 3b), we report the results when considering instead
a general measure of country governance, "Rule of Law", also drawn from Worldwide Governance
Indicators, and that captures the perceptions of the quality of contract enforcement and property
rights.17
The rst interesting aspect to notice is that investing or destination countries displaying above
the median values of control of corruption, do not display in general (for non EMU countries) larger
FPE foreign investments, as proven by the non statistically signicant coe¢ cient of the corresponding
variables. Conversely, higher than median Rule of Law, both for source and for host countries,
induces larger FPE. When looking instead at the interaction of the higher than median control of
corruption dummy with the EMU dummy, its coe¢ cients are positive and statistically signicant, for
both corruption indexes, and regardless of the role of the upper median country (source or host): it
detects a peculiar and exclusive e¤ect played by the control of corruption on EMU country pairs (WGI
index: 18% and 25% larger bilateral FPE for source and host, respectively; Perceived index: 28% and
40% larger bilateral FPE for source and host, respectively). Conversely, no such an additional e¤ect
is found for "Rule of law", since all interaction termscoe¢ cients are non statistically signicant.18
These ndings corroborate the conjecture that the worsening of a specic dimension of institu-
tional standards of EMU destination economies, that is, the control of corruption, likely due to the
e¤ect of the crisis, might have triggered a decline in bilateral FPE among EMU countries.
We show the dynamics of this indexes for EMU countries, and then compare them to the world
dynamics. We aim at detecting, rst, whether the euro area has experienced a relative wider drop
in control of corruption, thus becoming particularly less attractive for EMU investors; second, how
17In Table 10A in Appendix B, we consider, as country governance index alternative to "Rule of Law", "Government
e¤ectiveness" (capturing the perceptions of government credibility and independence of public services from political
pressures) and Regulation quality(capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to promote private sector
development), with results similar to "Rule of Law".
18In Table 10A, when considering "Government E¤ectiveness" and "Regulation" as alternative country governance
to "Rule of Law", we nd similar ndings: signicant impact in general, but not additional contribution for EMU
country pairs (with the only exception of a 10% signicant coe¢ cient in column 1a))
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far this worsening of institutional standards is due to the entrance of new countries, rather than to
a deterioration of old memberscountry governance after the crisis.
[Figure 3]
In Figure 3, we show the time-varying average of the two indexes of control of corruption adopted,
for the whole EMU group, for OLD EMU, for New countries, and for NEW EMU (panel 1a) and
2a)). We observe that, in general, the indices of New countries and NEW EMU are placed below the
indices of OLD EMU. For EMU, we record a downward sloping trend for all indices after the crisis.
OLD EMU display a atter, but still downward sloping dynamic, as well: since the composition of
countries within the OLD group is xed, the decreasing dynamic implies a marginally worsening of
the average control of corruption index after the crisis.
The dynamics of EMU reect the trend of OLD EMU until 2007, and of OLD EMU plus NEW
EMU since 2007 onward: since the EMU line is always below the OLD EMU line, it implies that
the enlargement to NEW EMU countries has denitely reduced the average level of the control
of corruption indexes. The way new member countries have contributed to this decrease is less
straightforward: the entrance of a pool of countries whose level of the index is lower inevitably
reduces the overall average, but if the distance between EMU and OLD EMU increases over time,
then it can be due to a worsening of the indexes of the NEW EMU already in, or to the entrance
of countries with an equal or even lower institutional level. From panels 1a) and 2a) of Figure 3, we
notice that the mean of the indexes for NEW EMU is rather at since 2009 onwards, and that the
mean of New countries across various indices is never decreasing over time: the crisis has not awed
the control of corruption standards of these countries, on average. However, the composition of the
NEW EMU group is not xed and varies with the entrance of new members: the entrance of better
members in terms of country governance could compensate the behavior of previously entered new
members, whose performance could have deteriorated because of the crisis.
To be able to detect this eventual compensation, in panels 1d) and 2d), we show the trend of
the two corruption indices for all New countries. We cannot seize any systematic downward trend
for any country or any index, as they appear quite at over time: the erratic dynamics of country
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governance observed for NEW EMU countries in panel 2a) are rather due to the entrance of new
members in the group than to the e¤ect of the crisis on incumbent new members.
In panel 1b) and 2b), we compare the dynamics of EMU countriesgovernance with the dynamics
of the worlds governance.
We observe that the world median, rst and third quartile are never decreasing over time for both
indexes of control of corruption. When looking at EMU countries, the third quartiles dynamics are
quite at, while the median, and, more signicantly, the rst quartile of EMU countries displays an
evident downward trend, especially pronounced for the WGI index.
Panel 1c) and 2c) focus on the relative behavior of OLD EMU: the third quartile and the median
remain quite at, but the rst quartile, also among OLD EMU countries, shows a downward trend
for the WGI index.
This evidence is consistent with our conjecture about the mechanisms behind the collapse of the
EMU e¤ect. The bilateral investment within the EMU area are particularly sensitive to "control
of corruption", as shown in Table 10. The control of corruption standards of EMU countries have
signicantly deteriorated relative to the world standards, because of the enlargement process, which
included countries with weaker institutional standards, but also because of the crisis, which worsened
the relative position of the rst quartile of OLD EMU. A weaker country governance in the EMU
area has induced, in turn, lower investment by all countries, but more than proportionally by other
EMU countries, thus contributing to the contraction of the bilateral FPE in the Euro area.
The decreasing trend in country governance standards of the rst quartile of the OLD EMU
countries, suggests the presence of signicant heterogeneity within the OLD EMU group.
Panels 1e) and 2e) report the dynamics of the control of corruption indexes of the OLD EMU
countries: it is immediately evident the decreasing pattern of a group of countries, Greece, Italy,
Portugal and Spain, those more severely involved in the sovereign debt crisis.19
19Figure 3A in Appendix B, shows the same dynamics for the other three general country governance indexes (Rule
of Law, Government E¤ectiveness, and Regulation). The dynamics are close to the ones found for the control of
corruption index.
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7 Core vs. periphery
Wortmann and Stahl (2016), relying on a broad set of Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure indica-
tors, detect a homogeneous group of European Union core countries, while countries belonging to the
southern periphery, as well as most of the countries of the eastern enlargement, are found to form
very distinct clusters in terms of competitiveness, indebtedness, and economic performance.
Botta et al. (2018) provide empirical evidence about the widening divergence between the macro-
economic performances of core eurozone countries and peripheral economies.
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017) investigating cross-border holdings of portfolio debt instruments,
show how the debt crisis has changed substantially the impact of a common currency on foreign
holdings of domestic debt securities, only for countries more directly involved in the sovereign debt
crisis.
Panels 1e) and 2e) of Figure 3 suggest that, if the shrinkage in the bilateral FPE in the Euro area
is indeed driven by the deterioration of the control of corruption mechanisms, as we conjectured so
far, it should be mainly due to peripheral OLD EMU countries.
Following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017), among others, we distinguish within the OLD EMU
group, the Euro corecountries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands) and the Euro peripheryor Euro crisiscountries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
and Spain), and investigate their investment patterns.20
[Table 11]
Table 11 investigates the patterns of bilateral FPE of core (columns (1a) to (2b)) and periphery
Euro countries (columns (3a) to (4b)).
In column (1a) and (1b) of Table 11, we observe that bilateral FPE among Euro core countries
su¤ered for the crisis, but not dramatically (from 88% larger investment before the crisis, to 56%
during the crisis, to 65% after the crisis). When considering, instead, the cross investment of Euro
20Note that this classication is adopted, among others, also by De Grauwe and Ji (2018), who argue that there is no
deterministic force that condemns countries in the periphery to stay in the periphery indenitely, and that countries
that are in the periphery today can become part of the core and vice versa.
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core countries in Euro periphery countries (columns (2a) and (2b)), we observe a clear picture of
the collapse of the EMU linkages: on the whole period, their investments are 29% larger than other
countries, starting from 87% larger in the pre-crisis period, to only 5% larger investment after the
crisis.
When considering the investments of Euro periphery source countries in Euro core countries,
in columns (3a) and (3b) of Table 11, we observe that they are on average 56% larger than other
country pairs, starting from 52% in the pre-crisis period, to 34% during the crisis and increasing up
to 76% after the crisis.
Finally, the last two columns of Table 11 report the results relative to the within Euro periphery
group: the average investments are 110% larger than other country pairs; starting from 108% larger
FPE before the crisis, up to 181% during the crisis, but dropping to a 61% higher FPE after the
crisis: the drop of bilateral investment among periphery economies seems to have occurred after the
crisis.
The ndings of Table 11 suggest the hypothesis of a crucial role played by Euro periphery countries
as destination economies. The core-periphery linkages are the ones that have experienced the harshest
deterioration after the crisis.
This outcome is consistent with the above mentioned conjecture: when the peripheral countries
standards of living (GDP per capita), but, more markedly, control of corruption started deteriorating,
core countries rst, and, other periphery countries later, started withdrawing their foreign investment
there, thus accelerating the fall of FPE in the EMU area.
[Table 12]
To conclude the overview of the integration process in the Euro area, we report in Table 12,
the evolution of the investment patterns between New countries and OLD EMU, split in core and
periphery countries.21
To investigate the evolution over time of the linkages between Newmembers and Euro core/periphery
21Table 12A reports the same analysis, but considering the interaction of NEW EMU, rather than the New countries,
with core and periphery OLD EMU countries.
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members, we refer to the investment behavior of New countries, before and after the crisis, disregard-
ing the year they actually joined the EMU. In Table 12, we observe that New countries, on average
in the whole period, invest in core countries 40% less than other country pairs (column (1a)), but,
similarly to what observed relatively the full OLD group, we nd (column (1b)) that this average is
the outcome of a quite negative starting point before the crisis (-72%), of an improvement during
the crisis (-45%), and of a further rising after the crisis (-21%). When looking instead at the inward
investment in New countries by Euro core economies (columns (2a) and (2b)), we observe that the
average underweight is equal to -29%, with no signicant e¤ect if split over time. New countries
underweight Euro periphery economies more than Euro core periphery: the average -81% (column
(3a)) reects a -91% before and during the crisis and a marginal improvement to -71% after the crisis
(column (3b)). Euro periphery countries invest in New countries 39% less than other country pairs,
starting from an initial -50% (column (4a)), increasing their investment during the crisis, even over-
compensating the initial undervaluation (+17%), but then stepping back to the pre-crisis investment
level (column (4b)).
The dynamics of the investment patterns between New countries, core and periphery OLD EMU
can be summarized as follows. First, periphery and core countries generally underweight New coun-
triesequities in their portfolios, thus not contributing to tighten the EMU linkages that the crisis has
loosened. Second, New countries underweight peripheral countries more heavily than core countries,
in line with the institutional interpretation proposed so far. Finally, New countries, though generally
underweighting OLD EMU countries in their portfolios, show a signicant rise in their investments
in both peripheral and core countries over time, that is consistent with a progressive integration after
the enlargement.
8 Conclusions
Two decades after the inception of the Euro, the common currency e¤ect on bilateral foreign portfolio
equities has decreased by 40%. This paper tries to describe, measure and interpret this nding. We
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disentangle the investment dynamics of old members, to distinguish the role of the crisis from that
of the enlargement: since also the drop among the original EMU members is very close to 40%, the
crisis appears to have played a major role over the enlargement process.
We test the conjecture that the shrinkage of the EMU e¤ect is attributable to a decline in
economic development and country governance standards. The empirical evidence does not reject this
hypothesis. On the one hand, the crisis has deteriorated the wealth and the institutional standards
of old member countries. On the other hand, the enlargement has opened the union to countries with
lower economic development and country governance, thus making these economies not attractive
enough for old members.
Among OLD EMU countries, we detect a peculiar deterioration of the control of corruption
standards of Euro periphery countries, those more severely injured by the sovereign debt crisis. The
nancial linkages between periphery and core countries, quite strong before the crisis, experienced a
collapse afterwards, thus dragging down the linkages in the OLD EMU group.
It is worth stressing that this paper does not aim to assess and measure the benets of en-
largement, which cannot be constrained to the narrow perspective of nancial integration in foreign
portfolio equities. The enlargement process has proven so far quite weak in fostering investment from
old to new members, but has signicantly increased the holdings of new countries in old members
markets. The paper suggests instead that, one the one hand, the improvement of country gover-
nance in economies severely hit by the crisis, and, on the other hand, a convergence of new members
economic development and institutional standards to the old membersones are valuable means to
restore and further tighten stock market integration in the enlarged euro area in the near future.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and the regressors used in the
analysis. The subscript sh refers to the country-pair sh,* indicates that the corresponding variable is
included in the analysis for both the destination and the investing country.
Min  1st Qu  Median  Mean 3rd Qu Max St. dev
I. Dependent variable
Equitiess,h (US $) 0 0 8.10E+06 4.18E+09 3.04E+08 1.29E+12 2.901E+10
II. Size variables
Market cap* (US $) 3.80E+07 3.70E+09 3.55E+10 4.30E+11 1.75E+11 1.47E+13 1.80E+12
GDP per cap*  (US $) 447.00 7262.00 16681.00 24327.00 38166.00 1.19E+05 21976.61
GDP*  (US $) 1.27E+09 4.80E+10 2.14E+11 8.02E+11 5.54E+11 1.94E+13 2.07E+12
GDP* world ratio 0.0000 0.0006 0.0034 0.0128 0.0087 0.3180 0.0336
III. Gravity variables
Distances,h (miles) 59.62 2781.71 7364.45 7207.36 10159.53 19772.34 4735.46
Border dummys,h 0 0 0 0.03 0 1 0.17
Colonial dummys,h 0 0 0 0.05 0 1 0.22
Language dummys,h 0 0 0 0.11 0 1 0.31
Legal origins dummys,h 0 0 0 0.25 0 1 0.43
IV. Capital mobility
Capital mobility* 0.00 1.54 4.62 4.48 6.92 10.00 2.82
V. Institutional variables
Rule of Law* 0.50 53.80 76.55 70.13 90.60 100.00 24.07
Gov Effectiveness* 7.70 58.95 78.40 73.32 90.72 100.00 20.65
Regulatory quality* 2.40 59.80 78.50 73.14 91.12 100.00 21.51
Control of Corruption* 4.30 51.38 72.45 68.74 91.20 100.00 25.40
Perceived Control of Corruption* 17.00 37.00 53.00 56.33 75.00 99.00 21.86
Descriptive Statistics
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Figure 1. Bilateral Foreign Portfolio Equity investment (FPE).
This gure reports the dynamics of the bilateral FPE over time. Panel a) reports the regression coe¢ -
cients of FPE with the bilateral dummy EMU sh interacted with year dummy (equation 3, in the main text,
where EMU = EMU sh). The gure also displays the entrance of new EMU members and the period
split adopted in the paper (Pre-crisis, Crises, and Post-crises). Panel b) reports the regression coe¢ cients
of FPE on year dummy (equation 4, in the main text). Panel c) and d) report the regression coe¢ cients
of FPE on the bilateral dummy EMU s (or EMUh) interacted with year dummy (equation 3, in the main
text, where EMU = EMU s or EMUh). The value of the coe¢ cient in 2001 is normalized to 1 and the
other coe¢ cients are obtained relative to the 2001 value.
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Table 2. FPE and EMU
This table reports the results of a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006)), as from equation 2 in the main text, with individual country pair xed-e¤ects and robust
standard errors clustered by year. The dependent variable is log(FPEsh), where the subscript sh represents
the couple investing country s-destination country h. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and
10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
log(Distances,h) -0.064 *** -0.067 *** -0.065 ***
( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.011 )
Border dummys,h 0.378 *** 0.383 *** 0.393 ***
( 0.027 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.028 )
Language dummys,h 0.607 *** 0.608 *** 0.602 ***
( 0.027 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.026 )
Colonial dummys,h 1.723 *** 1.679 *** 1.664 ***
( 0.126 ) ( 0.132 ) ( 0.134 )
Legal origins dummys,h -0.046 ** -0.059 *** -0.064 ***
( 0.022 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.020 )
log(Market caps) 0.571 *** 0.569 *** 0.568 ***
( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.008 )
log(Market caph) 0.771 *** 0.774 *** 0.774 ***
( 0.007 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.009 )
log(GDP per caps) 1.633 *** 1.587 *** 1.588 ***
( 0.064 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.059 )
log(GDP per caph) 0.143 *** 0.114 *** 0.115 ***
( 0.046 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.041 )
log(Capital mobilitys) -0.010 0.041 0.069 **
( 0.040 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.030 )
log(Capital mobilityh) -0.095 *** -0.086 *** -0.087 ***
( 0.020 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 )
EMUs,h 0.564 *** 0.723 *** 0.719 ***
( 0.020 ) ( 0.026 ) ( 0.026 )
Financial crisis -0.237
( 0.188 )
Post financial crisis 0.167 *
( 0.092 )
EMUs,h*Fin. Crisis -0.170 ***
( 0.035 )








EMUs,h*Post crises -0.207 ***
( 0.046 )
Observations 45216 45216 45216
Adjusted R2 0.695 0.704 0.717
Dependent variable:  log(FPE)
38
Table 3. FPE and OLD EMU
This table reports the results of a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006)), as from equation 2 in the main text, with individual country pair xed-e¤ects and robust
standard errors clustered by year . The dependent variable is log(FPEsh), where the subscript sh represents
the couple investing country s-destination country h. All controls of Table 2 are included, but not reported.
The columns (#a) and (#b) consider specications, respectively, without and with interactions with crisis
and post-crisis dummy. Columns (1a) and (1b) consider the investments among OLD EMU countries,
columns (2a) and (2b) consider OLD EMU countries investing in EMU host countries, while the columns
(3a) and (3b) consider EMU source countries investing in OLD EMU host countries. ***, **, and *
indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLD EMUs*OLD EMUh 0.571 *** 0.721 ***
( 0.019 ) ( 0.026 )
Crises -0.111 -0.111 -0.111
( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 )
Post crises 0.286 *** 0.286 *** 0.285 ***
( 0.084 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.084 )
OLD EMUs*OLD EMUh*Crises -0.237 ***
( 0.035 )
OLD EMUs*OLD EMUh*Post crises -0.199 ***
( 0.047 )
OLD EMUs*EMUh 0.568 *** 0.720 ***
( 0.019 ) ( 0.026 )
OLD EMUs*EMUh*Crises -0.238 ***
( 0.035 )
OLD EMUs*EMUh*Post crises -0.203 ***
( 0.046 )
EMUs*OLD EMUh 0.567 *** 0.720 ***
( 0.020 ) ( 0.026 )
EMUs*OLD EMUh*Crises -0.243 ***
( 0.035 )
EMUs*OLD EMUh*Post crises -0.203 ***
( 0.047 )
Controls: size, gravity and capital
mobility variables
Observations 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216
Adjusted R2 0.695 0.717 0.694 0.717 0.695 0.717




This table reports the results of a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006)), as from equation 2 in the main text, with individual country pair xed-e¤ects and robust
standard errors clustered by year. The dependent variable is log(FPEsh), where the subscript sh represents
the couple investing country s-destination country h. All controls of Table 2 are included, but not reported.
The columns (1) to (4) refer to the baseline estimation adopted in the paper. In column (1) we report the
results of column (3) of Table 2, while columns (2) to (4) of Table 4a replicate columns (1b), (2b) and (3b)
of Table 3. The columns (5) to (8) replicate the estimates of columns (1) to (4), when the o¤shore list
follows Zoromé (2007). ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EMUs,h 0.719 *** 0.903 ***
( 0.026 ) ( 0.032 )
EMUs,h*Crises -0.245 *** -0.244 ***
( 0.035 ) ( 0.041 )
EMUs,h*Post crises -0.207 *** -0.268 ***
( 0.046 ) ( 0.047 )
OLD EMUs*OLD EMUh 0.721 *** 0.904 ***
( 0.026 ) ( 0.031 )
OLD EMUs*OLD EMUh*Crises -0.237 *** -0.235 ***
( 0.035 ) ( 0.041 )
OLD EMUs*OLD EMUh*Post crises -0.199 *** -0.260 ***
( 0.047 ) ( 0.047 )
OLD EMUs*EMUh 0.720 *** 0.903 ***
( 0.026 ) ( 0.032 )
OLD EMUs*EMUh*Crises -0.238 *** -0.237 ***
( 0.035 ) ( 0.041 )
OLD EMUs*EMUh*Post crises -0.203 *** -0.263 ***
( 0.046 ) ( 0.047 )
EMUs*OLD EMUh 0.720 *** 0.903 ***
( 0.026 ) ( 0.031 )
EMUs*OLD EMUh*Crises -0.243 *** -0.242 ***
( 0.035 ) ( 0.041 )
EMUs*OLD EMUh*Post crises -0.203 *** -0.265 ***
( 0.047 ) ( 0.047 )
Crises -0.111 -0.111 -0.111 -0.111 -0.075 -0.074 -0.074 -0.075
( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.120 ) ( 0.120 ) ( 0.120 ) ( 0.120 )
Post crises 0.286 *** 0.286 *** 0.286 *** 0.285 *** 0.374 *** 0.374 *** 0.374 *** 0.374 ***
( 0.084 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.097 )
Controls: size, gravity and capital
mobility variables
Observations 45216 45216 45216 45216 49 458 38585 38585 38585 38585
Adjusted R2 0.717 0.717 0.717 0.717 0.582 0.691 0.691 0.691 0.691
Dependent variable:  log(FPE)
Baseline regression No offshore countries (IMF, 2007)
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Table 5. Summary of the e¤ects of EMU on FPE
This table reports a summary of the results two specications in Table 4 (I. Baseline model and II. No
o¤shore (IMF, 2007) ) and 4A in Appendix B (III. No o¤shore (L&M-F, 2017) and IV. Alternative Crisis
period (2007-2012)). Columns (1) to (3) report the marginal e¤ect of the dummy variable at the head of
the rows on FPE. The marginal e¤ect, in percentage terms, is obtained as follows: (e 1)  100, where 
is the coe¢ cient reported in Tables 4a/4b. Columns (4) and (5) report, for the dummies at the head of
the rows, the change in the marginal e¤ects, respectively, in the crisis period and in the post crisis period,







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
I. Baseline model
(col. (1)-(4), Table 4)
EMUs-EMUh 105% 61% 67% -42% -36%
OLDs-OLDh 105% 62% 68% -41% -36%
OLDs-EMUh 105% 62% 68% -41% -36%
EMUs-OLDh 105% 61% 68% -42% -36%
II. No offshore (IMF, 2007)
(col. (5)-(8), Table 4)
EMUs-EMUh 146% 83% 88% -43% -40%
OLDs-OLDh 146% 85% 89% -42% -39%
OLDs-EMUh 146% 84% 89% -42% -39%
EMUs-OLDh 146% 83% 89% -43% -39%
III. No offshore (L&M-F, 2017)
(col. (1)-(4), Table 4A)
EMUs-EMUh 147% 93% 89% -36% -40%
OLDs-OLDh 147% 95% 90% -35% -38%
OLDs-EMUh 147% 95% 90% -35% -39%
EMUs-OLDh 147% 94% 89% -36% -39%
IV. Alternative crisis period (2007-2012 )
(col. (5)-(8), Table 4A)
EMUs-EMUh 110% 68% 67% -38% -39%
OLDs-OLDh 110% 69% 68% -37% -38%
OLDs-EMUh 110% 69% 67% -37% -39%
EMUs-OLDh 110% 68% 67% -38% -39%







Table 6. FPE and NEW EMU
This table reports the results of a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006)), as from equation 2 in the main text, with individual country pair xed-e¤ects and robust
standard errors clustered by year. The dependent variable is log (FPEsh), where the subscript sh represents
the couple investing country s-destination country h. All controls of Table 2 are included, but not reported.
The columns (1) and (2) consider the investment patterns between NEW EMU and the whole group of
EMU countries (OLD EMU and NEW EMU), while columns (3) and (4) replicate the same analysis
when considering the investment patterns between NEW EMU and OLD EMU . Finally, columns (5)
considers the investment patterns among NEW EMU . When referring to NEW EMU , we consider the
associated dummy equal to 1 only at the time of entrance (and thereafter) of the country in the union. ***,
**, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NEW EMUs*EMUh -0.634 ***
( 0.140 )
EMUs *NEW EMUh -0.280 ***
( 0.105 )
NEW EMUs*OLD EMUh -0.680 ***
( 0.134 )
OLD EMUs *NEW EMUh -0.309 ***
( 0.112 )
NEW EMUs*NEW EMUh 0.975 ***
( 0.288 )
Crises -0.135 -0.135 -0.135 -0.135 -0.135
( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 )
Post crises 0.266 *** 0.265 *** 0.266 *** 0.265 *** 0.265 ***
( 0.086 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.085 )
Controls: size, gravity and capital
mobility variables
Observations 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216
Adjusted R2 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.709
Dependent variable:  log(FPE)
NEW EMU
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Table 7. FPE and New countries
This table reports the results of a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006)), as from equation 2 in the main text, with individual country pair xed-e¤ects and robust
standard errors clustered by year. The dependent variable is log (FPEsh), where the subscript sh represents
the couple investing country s-destination country h. All controls of Table 2 are included, but not reported.
The columns (#a) and (#b) consider specications, respectively, without and with interactions with crisis
and post-crisis dummy. Columns (1a) to (2b) consider the investment patterns between New country
and the whole EMU group (OLD EMU and NEW EMU). Columns (3a) to (4b) replicate the same
analysis when considering the investment patters betweenOLD EMU andNew country. Finally, columns
(4a) and (4b) consider the investment patterns among New country. To estimate the change in investment
patterns of New country, we consider the associated dummy equal to 1 at any point in time, regardless of
the time of entrance of the new country in the union. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and
10% levels, respectively.
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
New countrys*EMUh -0.704 *** -1.526 ***
( 0.096 ) ( 0.147 )
New countrys*EMUh*Crises 0.613 ***
( 0.138 )
New countrys*EMUh*Post crises 1.120 ***
( 0.150 )
EMUs *New countryh -0.350 *** -0.473 *
( 0.084 ) ( 0.242 )
EMUs *New countryh *Crises 0.272
( 0.267 )
EMUs *New countryh *Post crises 0.100
( 0.289 )
New countrys*OLD EMUh -0.770 *** -1.527 ***
( 0.094 ) ( 0.147 )
New countrys*OLD EMUh*Crises 0.551 ***
( 0.130 )
New countrys*OLD EMUh*Post crises 1.049 ***
( 0.154 )
OLD EMUs *New countryh -0.374 *** -0.473 *
( 0.085 ) ( 0.242 )
OLD EMUs *New countryh *Crises 0.268
( 0.268 )
OLD EMUs *New countryh *Post crises 0.046
( 0.296 )
New countrys*New countryh 1.375 *** 1.432 ***
( 0.154 ) ( 0.386 )
New countrys*New countryh*Crises -0.140
( 0.412 )
New countrys*New countryh*Post crises -0.023
( 0.393 )
Crises -0.135 -0.135 -0.135 -0.136 -0.135 -0.135 -0.135 -0.136 -0.135 -0.135
( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 )
Post crises 0.265 *** 0.265 *** 0.265
**
* 0.265 *** 0.266 *** 0.265 *** 0.265 *** 0.265 *** 0.265 *** 0.265 ***
( 0.086 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.085 )
Controls: size, gravity and capital
mobility variables
Observations 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216
Adjusted R2 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.709
Dependent variable:  log(FPE)
New countries
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics split by OLD and NEW EMU
This table reports the descriptive statistics of size and institutional variables used in the analysis, relative
to EMU, OLD EMU and NEW EMU countries. The subscript  indicates that the corresponding variable
is included in the analysis for both the destination and the investing country.
Min  1st Qu  Median  Mean 3rd Qu Max St. dev
I. EMU
Size variables
GDP per cap (US $) 11729.00 23196.00 32763.00 37229.00 45703.00 119225.00 20075.20
GDP (US $) 8.53E+09 8.95E+10 2.66E+11 7.53E+11 1.07E+12 3.89E+12 9.83E+11
Market cap (US $) 4.93E+08 2.73E+10 8.29E+10 3.18E+11 5.71E+11 1.29E+12 4.09E+11
Institutional variables
Rule of Law 56.70 81.70 88.90 86.77 95.20 100.00 10.31
Govt. Effectiveness 60.20 80.10 88.80 86.47 93.60 100.00 9.19
Regulatory quality 59.10 80.30 87.75 87.06 94.20 99.50 8.59
Control of Corruption 52.40 77.70 89.00 84.35 93.40 100.00 12.14
Perceived Control of Corruption 33.90 58.78 70.00 68.53 80.00 99.00 14.65
II. OLD EMU
Size variables
GDP per cap (US $) 11729.00 27270.00 38911.00 41348.00 47983.00 119225.00 20541.76
GDP  (US $) 2.13E+10 2.32E+11 4.10E+11 9.42E+11 1.48E+12 3.89E+12 1.03E+12
Market cap (US $) 2.73E+10 7.15E+10 2.06E+11 4.02E+11 5.88E+01 1.29E+12 4.22E+11
Institutional variables
Rule of Law 56.70 84.10 90.75 88.26 96.20 100.00 10.59
Govt. Effectiveness 60.20 82.83 91.30 87.82 94.33 100.00 9.65
Regulatory quality 59.10 81.25 91.00 88.16 95.70 99.50 8.77
Control of Corruption 52.40 82.50 90.90 86.59 94.45 100.00 12.12
Perceived Control of Corruption 33.90 63.00 74.00 71.17 82.00 99.00 15.02
III. NEW EMU
Size variables
GDP per cap (US $) 13640.00 17422.00 21788.00 21669.00 24634.00 35391.00 5024.66
GDP (US $) 8.53E+09 2.26E+10 2.75E+10 3.96E+10 4.88E+10 1.01E+11 2.75E+10
Market cap (US $) 4.93E+08 1.41E+09 1.67E+09 2.41E+09 3.18E+09 5.60E+09 1.75E+09
Institutional variables
Rule of Law 64.80 80.30 82.40 81.14 86.40 91.80 6.63
Gov Effectiveness 73.90 78.20 81.15 81.37 83.90 92.40 4.39
Regulatory quality 72.10 78.20 82.70 82.87 88.30 93.30 6.29
Control of Corruption 60.10 70.20 77.80 75.87 81.00 88.90 7.64
Perceived Control of Corruption 39.70 55.23 58.85 58.56 63.38 71.00 7.00
Descriptive Statistics EMU, OLD EMU, New EMU
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Table 9. FPE and size factors
This table reports the results of a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006)), as from equation 2 in the main text, with individual country pair xed-e¤ects and robust
standard errors clustered by year. The dependent variable is log(FPEsh), where the subscript sh represents
the couple investing country s-destination country h. All controls of Table 2 are included, but not reported.
This table considers the interaction of the bilateral EMU dummy EMU sh with the three measures of size
adopted in the paper, two time-varying (GDP per capita, GDP) and one time-invariant (market capitaliza-
tion). The letter H placed before the size variable stands for "High", and indicates a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the corresponding size variable is above the median, and 0 otherwise. Columns (#a) consider the
size variables relative to the source countries, while columns (#b) consider the size variables relative to the
host countries. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
EMUs,h 0.247 -0.743 ** 1.259 *** 0.473 *** 0.440 *** 0.477 ***
( 0.268 ) ( 0.368 ) ( 0.135 ) ( 0.176 ) ( 0.025 ) ( 0.077 )
H GDP per caps 1.845 *** 1.846 ***
( 0.084 ) ( 0.084 )
H GDP per caph 0.065 0.060
( 0.097 ) ( 0.097 )
EMUs,h *H GDP per caps 0.185
( 0.273 )
EMUs,h *H GDP per caph 1.180 ***
( 0.370 )
H GDPs US$ -0.921 *** -1.096 ***
( 0.089 ) ( 0.092 )
H GDPh US$ 0.632 *** 0.610 ***
( 0.060 ) ( 0.059 )
EMUs,h* H GDPs US$ -1.004 ***
( 0.103 )
EMUs,h* H GDPh US$ 0.061
( 0.173 )
H Mktcaps 0.958 *** 0.921 ***
( 0.032 ) ( 0.031 )
H Mktcaph 2.863 *** 2.875 ***
( 0.029 ) ( 0.028 )
EMUs,h* H Mktcaps -0.163 ***
( 0.032 )
EMUs,h* H Mktcaph -0.160 *
( 0.082 )
Controls: size, gravity and
capital mobility variables
Observations 45353 45353 45353 45353 46128 46128
Adjusted R2 0.601 0.601 0.631 0.626 0.164 0.163
Dependent variable:  log(FPE)
GDP per cap GDP Mktcap
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Figure 2. Dynamics of GDP per capita (k US$).
This table reports the dynamics of the average of the GDP per capita. Panel a) refers to EMU and
OLD EMU; panel b) to NEW EMU (dummy equal to 1 when the new country enters the union) and New
countries (dummy equal to 1 associated to the new countries, regardless of the time of entrance); panel
c) reports the rst quartile (Q1), the median (MEDIAN) and the third quartile (Q3) for EMU countries,
together with the respective world average quartiles; panel d) replicates panel c) for OLD EMU countries
(right panel); panel e) reports the dynamics for each of the new countries entering the EMU; panel f) reports
the dynamics for each of the OLD EMU countries.
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Table 10. FPE and institutional factors
This table reports the results of a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006)), as from equation 2 in the main text, with individual s  h country pair xed-e¤ect and
robust standard errors clustered by year. The dependent variable is log(FPEsh), where the subscript sh
represents the couple investing country s-destination country h. All controls of Table 2 are included, but
not reported. This table considers the interaction of the bilateral EMU dummy EMU sh with two measures
of country governance drawn from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, World Bank), "Control
of Corruption" and "Rule of Law", plus an alternative specication of "perceived control of corruption"
(Transparency International) The letter H placed before the institutional variable stands for "High" and
indicates a dummy variable equal to 1 if the corresponding institutional variable is above the median, and
0 otherwise. Columns (#a) consider the size variables relative to the source countries, while columns (#b)
consider the size variables relative to the host countries. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and
10% levels, respectively.
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
EMUs,h 0.413 *** 0.374 *** 0.334 *** 0.264 ** 0.619 *** 0.520 ***
( 0.061 ) ( 0.073 ) ( 0.089 ) ( 0.107 ) ( 0.071 ) ( 0.085 )
H Control of corrupt WGIs 0.029 0.068
( 0.091 ) ( 0.082 )
H Control of corrupt WGIh -0.016 -0.062
( 0.050 ) ( 0.062 )
EMUs,h*H Control of corrupt WGIs 0.166 **
( 0.077 )
EMUs,h*H Control of corrupt WGIh 0.225 ***
( 0.077 )
H Perceived control of corrupts -0.047 0.005
( 0.144 ) ( 0.130 )
H Perceived control of corrupth -0.014 -0.073
( 0.080 ) ( 0.096 )
EMUs,h*H Perceived control of corrupts 0.246 **
( 0.107 )
EMUs,h*H Perceived control of corrupth 0.339 ***
( 0.119 )
H Rule of laws 0.251 ** 0.239 **
( 0.126 ) ( 0.109 )
H Rule of lawh 0.137 *** 0.128 **
( 0.050 ) ( 0.059 )
EMUs,h* H Rule of laws -0.061
( 0.081 )
EMUs,h* H Rule of lawh 0.047
( 0.083 )
Controls: size, gravity and capital
mobility variables
Observations 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216
Adjusted R2 0.694 0.696 1 0.695 0.694 0.696 0.696
Dependent variable:  log(FPE)
Index WGI (World Bank)
Rule of Law
Index WGI (World Bank)
Control of Corruption
Perceived Index (Transparency Intl.)
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Figure 3. Dynamics of the corruption index.
This table reports the dynamics of the "Control of Corruption" index, drawn from the Worldwide
Governance Indicators (WGI, World Bank) in the left panels (column 1), and of the "Perceived Control of
Corruption" index, drawn from Transparency International, in the right panels (column 2). Panel a) refers
to EMU, OLD EMU, NEW EMU (dummy equal to 1 when the new country enters the union) and New
countries (dummy equal to 1 associated to the new countries, regardless of the time of entrance); panel
b) reports the rst quartile (Q1), the median (MEDIAN) and the third quartile (Q3) for EMU countries,
together with the respective world average quartiles; panel c) replicates panel b) for OLD EMU countries;
panel d) reports the dynamics for each of the new countries entering the EMU; panel e) reports the dynamics
for each of the OLD EMU countries.
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Table 11. Core vs. periphery
This table reports the results of a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006)), as from equation 2 in the main text, with individual country pair xed-e¤ects and robust
standard errors clustered by year. The dependent variable is log(FPEsh), where the subscript sh represents
the couple investing country s-destination country h. All controls of Table 2 are included, but not reported.
In this table the group of OLD EMU countries is split into core and periphery countries. The columns
(#a) and (#b) consider specications, respectively, without and with interactions with crisis and post-
crisis dummy. The columns (1a) to (2b) consider the Cores countries investing in Coreh countries or in
Peripheryh countries, while columns (3a) to (4b) consider the Peripherys countries investing in Coreh
countries or in Peripheryh countries. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels,
respectively.
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
Cores* Coreh 0.523 *** 0.633 ***
( 0.011 ) ( 0.036 )
Cores*Coreh*Crises -0.188 ***
( 0.032 )
Cores*Coreh*Post crises -0.133 ***
( 0.051 )
Cores*Peripheryh 0.251 *** 0.625 ***
( 0.011 ) ( 0.039 )
Cores*Peripheryh *Crises -0.575 ***
( 0.079 )
Cores*Peripheryh *Post crises -0.580 ***
( 0.056 )
Peripherys*Coreh 0.443 *** 0.418 ***
( 0.034 ) ( 0.029 )
Peripherys*Coreh *Crises -0.129 ***
( 0.037 )
Peripherys*Coreh *Post crises 0.147 ***
( 0.047 )
Peripherys*Peripheryh 0.745 *** 0.733 ***
( 0.011 ) ( 0.113 )
Peripherys*Peripheryh *Crises 0.300 **
( 0.152 )
Peripherys*Peripheryh*Post crises -0.257 **
( 0.114 )
Crises -0.130 -0.119 -0.136 -0.123 -0.139 -0.138 -0.138 -0.140
( 0.109 ) ( 0.110 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.108 ) ( 0.108 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 )
Post crises 0.270 *** 0.278 *** 0.265 *** 0.277 *** 0.260 *** 0.258 *** 0.262 *** 0.263 ***
( 0.086 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.085 )
Size, gravity and capital mobility
variables included
Observations 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216
Adjusted R2 0.717 0.717 0.709 0.709 0.710 0.710 0.709 0.709
Dependent variable:  log(FPE)
Source Core Source Periphery
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Table 12. New countries and Core/periphery
This table reports the results of a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006)), as from equation 2 in the main text, with individual country pair xed-e¤ects and robust
standard errors clustered by year. The dependent variable is log(FPEsh), where the subscript sh represents
the couple investing country s-destination country h. All controls of Table 2 are included, but not reported.
The columns (#a) and (#b) consider specications, respectively, without and with interactions with crisis
and post-crisis dummy. The columns (1a) to (2b) consider the investment patterns between Core and
New country, while columns (3a) to (4b) consider the investment patterns between Periphery and New
country. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
New countrys* Coreh -0.507 *** -1.276 ***
( 0.101 ) ( 0.162 )
New countrys*Coreh*Crises 0.615 ***
( 0.152 )
New countrys*Coreh*Post crises 1.043 ***
( 0.180 )
Cores*New countryh -0.342 *** -0.400
( 0.101 ) ( 0.256 )
Cores*New countryh *Crises 0.089
( 0.278 )
Cores*New countryh *Post crises 0.076
( 0.316 )
New countrys*Peripheryh -1.657 *** -2.449 ***
( 0.255 ) ( 0.067 )
New countrys*Peripheryh*Crises 0.245
( 0.152 )
New countrys*Peripheryh*Post crises 1.202 ***
( 0.324 )
Peripherys*New countryh -0.489 *** -0.694 ***
( 0.101 ) ( 0.194 )
Peripherys*New countryh *Crises 0.849 ***
( 0.257 )
Peripherys*New countryh*Post crises -0.289
( 0.222 )
Crises -0.135 -0.135 -0.135 -0.135 -0.135 -0.135 -0.135 -0.135
( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 )
Post crises 0.265 *** 0.265 *** 0.265 *** 0.265 *** 0.265 *** 0.265 *** 0.265 *** 0.265 ***
( 0.086 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.085 )
Controls: size, gravity and capital
mobility variables
Observations 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216 45216
Adjusted R2 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.709
Dependent variable:  log(FPE)




Foreign Portfolio Equities: Cross-border holdings of equities issued by host country residents and
hold by the source country residents. Source: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF).
Investing and destination countries
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China
Hong Kong, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauri-
tius, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Venezuela.
O¤shore centres
Note that, as exception to the list above, the below mentioned countries are considered as investing,
but not as destination economies.
Baseline specication: the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Hong Kong SAR, Ireland, and Singapore
(Damgaard et al. (2018)).
Robustness, Table 4b (1)-(4): Bahrain, Hong Kong, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauri-
tius, the Netherlands, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland, Belgium, United Kingdom (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2017))
Robustness, Table 4b (5)-(8): Bahrain, Barbados, Hong Kong, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Malta, Mauritius, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Latvia, Uruguay (Zoromé
(2007))
II. Size variables
Market capitalization: Market value for listed domestic companies (in current U.S.$, year 2001).
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).
GDP per capita: Gross domestic product divided by midyear population (in current U.S.$).
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
GDP in US$: Gross Domestic Product, Current U.S. Dollars, Annual, Not Seasonally Adjusted.
Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).
III. Gravity variables
Distance: Measure of the distance between the capital of the source and the host country, estimated
with the great circle distance in miles. Source: CEPIIs distance measures, the GeoDist database.
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Border dummy: Dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 when a pair of countries have
at least one border in common, and 0 otherwise. Source: CEPIIs distance measures, the GeoDist
database.
Colonial dummy: Dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 for those pair of countries that
share a common colonial past, and 0 otherwise. Source: CEPIIs distance measures, the GeoDist
database.
Language dummy: Dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 when a pair of countries have
an o¢ cial language in common, and 0 otherwise. Source: CEPIIs distance measures, the GeoDist
database.
Legal origins dummy: Dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 for those pair of countries
that share a common origin (British, French, Socialist, German or Scandinavian).
IV. Capital mobility
Capital mobility: Rank from 1 to 10 of the capital mobility, for both the source and the host country.
Source: Economic Freedom of the World.
V. Institutional variables
Perceived Corruption Index. The index scores and ranks countries and territories around the world
on the perceived level of corruption in the public sector. It is an aggregate index which scores 1-100
from very clean to highly corrupted countries and which draws on a number of di¤erent data sources
that capture business and expert views across di¤erent countries. Source: Transparency International
(https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi)
Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank of control of corruption in the host country. Control of
corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and
private interests. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators.
Rule of Law: Percentile Rank of rule of law in the host country. Rule of law captures perceptions
of the extent to which agents have condence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood
of crime and violence. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators.
Government e¤ectiveness: Percentile Rank of government e¤ectiveness in the host country. Gov-
ernment e¤ectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation
and implementation, and the credibility of the governments commitment to such policies. Source:
Worldwide Governance Indicators.
Regulatory quality: Percentile Rank of regulatory quality in the host country. Regulatory quality
captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and




EMUsh: Dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 for each pair of countries that are both
members of EMU, and 0 otherwise.
EMUs: Dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 for investing countries that are EMU
members, and 0 otherwise (EMUh: 1 for host countries that are EMU members, and 0 otherwise)
OLD EMUs: Dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 for investing countries that are
original EMU members, and 0 otherwise (OLD EMUh: 1 for host countries that are original EMU
members, and 0 otherwise)
New countrys: Dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 for those investing countries
that enter the EMU after the enlargement, and 0 otherwise, independently of the year in which they
joined the EMU (New countryh: 1 for host countries that enter the EMU after the enlargement, and
0 otherwise)
Cores: Dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 if the investing countries are Austria, Bel-
gium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and 0 otherwise (Coreh: 1 if the
host countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands,
and 0 otherwise)
Peripherys: Dummy variable that takes the value equal to 1 if the investing countries are Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, and 0 otherwise (Peripheryh: 1 if the host countries are Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, and 0 otherwise)
VII. Crises dummies
Financial crisis: Dummy variable taking the value equal to 1 for 2008-2009 years, and 0 otherwise.
Post nancial crisis: Dummy variable taking the value 1 for 2010-2017 years, and 0 otherwise.
Crises: Dummy variable that captures both the nancial and the sovereign debt crisis; it takes
the value equal to 1 for 2008-2012 years, and 0 otherwise (in the specication of Table 4b, columns
(5) to (8), the crisis period starts in 2007).
Post crises: Dummy variable taking the value 1 for 2013-2017 years, and 0 otherwise.
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B Additional Tables
Table 4A. Robustness: alternative o¤shore sample and crisis denition
This table reports the results of a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006)), as from equation 2 in the main text, with individual country pair xed-e¤ects and robust
standard errors clustered by year. The dependent variable is log(FPEsh), where the subscript sh represents
the couple investing country s-destination country h. All controls of Table 2 are included, but not reported.
The columns (1) to (4) and (5) to (8) replicate the estimates of columns (1) to (4) of Table 4, when the
o¤shore list follows Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017). The columns (5) to (8) replicate the estimates of
columns (1) to (4), when the crisis period is 2007-2012 (instead of 2008-2012). ***, **, and * indicate
signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EMUs,h 0.900 *** 0.739 ***
( 0.039 ) ( 0.027 )
EMUs,h*Crises -0.296 *** -0.222 ***
( 0.045 ) ( 0.048 )
EMUs,h*Post crises -0.269 *** -0.230 ***
( 0.054 ) ( 0.046 )
OLD EMUs*OLD EMUh 0.901 *** 0.740 ***
( 0.039 ) ( 0.027 )
OLD EMUs*OLD EMUh*Crises -0.288 *** -0.215 ***
( 0.045 ( 0.048 )
OLD EMUs*OLD EMUh*Post crises -0.262 *** -0.221 ***
( 0.054 ) ( 0.047 )
OLD EMUs*EMUh 0.901 *** 0.740 ***
( 0.039 ) ( 0.027 )
OLD EMUs*EMUh*Crises -0.290 *** -0.217 ***
( 0.045 ) ( 0.048 )
OLD EMUs*EMUh*Post crises -0.265 *** -0.226 ***
( 0.054 ) ( 0.046 )
EMUs*OLD EMUh 0.901 *** 0.740 ***
( 0.039 ) ( 0.027 )
EMUs*OLD EMUh*Crises -0.295 *** -0.220 ***
( 0.045 ) ( 0.048 )
EMUs*OLD EMUh*Post crises -0.267 *** -0.226 ***
( 0.054 ) ( 0.047 )
Crises -0.093 -0.092 -0.092 -0.093 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
( 0.118 ) ( 0.118 ) ( 0.118 ) ( 0.117 ) ( 0.118 ) ( 0.118 ) ( 0.118 ) ( 0.118 )
Post crises 0.359 *** 0.360 *** 0.360 *** 0.359 *** 0.365 *** 0.365 *** 0.365 *** 0.365 ***
( 0.094 ) ( 0.094 ) ( 0.094 ) ( 0.094 ) ( 0.099 ) ( 0.099 ) ( 0.099 ) ( 0.099 )
Controls: size, gravity and capital
mobility variables
Observations 39296 39296 39296 39296
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34 45216 45216 45216 45216
Adjusted R2 0.688 0.688 0.688 0.688 0.715 0.715 0.715 0.716
Dependent variable:  log(FPE)
Crisis period (2007-2012)No offshore countries (M&F, 2017)
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Figure 2A. Dynamics of GDP (bln US$)
This table replicates Figure 2 in the main text, replacing the GDP per capita with the GDP. Panel a)
refers to EMU and OLD EMU; panel b) to NEW EMU (dummy equal to 1 when the new country enters
the union) and New countries (dummy equal to 1 associated to the new countries, regardless of the time of
entrance); panel c) reports the rst quartile (Q1), the median (MEDIAN) and the third quartile (Q3) for
EMU countries, together with the respective world average quartiles; panel d) replicates panel c) for OLD
EMU countries (right panel); panel e) reports the dynamics for each of the new countries entering the EMU;
panel f) reports the dynamics for each of the OLD EMU countries.
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Table 10A. FPE and alternative institutional factors
This table reports the results of a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006)), as from equation 2 in the main text, with individual s  h country pair xed-e¤ect and
robust standard errors clustered by year. The dependent variable is log(FPEsh), where the subscript sh
represents the couple investing country s-destination country h. All controls of Table 2 are included, but not
reported. This table considers the interaction of the bilateral EMU dummy EMU sh with two alternative
measures of country governance drawn from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, World Bank),
"Government E¤ectiveness" and "Regulation". The letter H placed before the institutional variable stands
for "High" and indicates a dummy variable equal to 1 if the corresponding institutional variable is above the
median, and 0 otherwise. Columns (#a) consider the size variables relative to the source countries, while
columns (#b) consider the size variables relative to the host countries. ***, **, and * indicate signicance
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
EMUs,h 0.430 *** 0.463 *** 0.478 *** 0.482 ***
( 0.059 ) ( 0.091 ) ( 0.067 ) ( 0.083 )
H Govt. effects 0.113 0.148 *
( 0.089 ) ( 0.082 )
H Govt. effecth 0.079 * 0.054
( 0.043 ) ( 0.051 )
EMUs,h* H Govt. effects 0.148 *
( 0.076 )
EMUs,h* H Govt. Effecth 0.121
( 0.089 )
H Regulations 0.183 ** 0.202 **
( 0.089 ) ( 0.079 )
H Regulationh 0.109 * 0.091
( 0.060 ) ( 0.070 )
EMUs,h* H Regulations 0.093
( 0.084 )
EMUs,h* H Regulationh 0.096
( 0.091 )
Controls: size, gravity and
capital mobility variables
Observations 45216 45216 45216 45216
Adjusted R2 0.696 0.696 0.696 1 0.696
Dependent variable:  log(FPE)
Govt effect WGI (World Bank) Regulation WGI (World Bank)
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Figure 3A. Dynamics of other institutional factors.
This table reports the dynamics of alternative institutional indexes, drawn from the Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators (WGI, World Bank), "Rule of Law" (column 1), "Government E¤ectiveness" (column 2)
and "Regulation" (column 3).
Panel a) refers to EMU, OLD EMU, NEW EMU (dummy equal to 1 when the new country enters the
union) and New countries (dummy equal to 1 associated to the new countries, regardless of the time of
entrance); panel b) reports the rst quartile (Q1), the median (MEDIAN) and the third quartile (Q3) for
EMU countries, together with the respective world average quartiles; panel c) replicates panel b) for OLD
EMU countries; panel d) reports the dynamics for each of the new countries entering the EMU; panel e)
reports the dynamics for each of the OLD EMU countries.
57
Table 12A. NEW EMU and Core/periphery
This table reports the results of a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood regression (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006)), as from equation 2 in the main text, with individual country pair xed-e¤ects and robust
standard errors clustered by year. The dependent variable is log(FPEsh), where the subscript sh represents
the couple investing country s-destination country h. All controls of Table 2 are included, but not reported.
The columns (1) and (2) consider the investment patterns between Core and NEW EMU , while columns
(3) and (4) consider the investment patterns between Periphery and NEW EMU . ***, **, and * indicate
signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NEW EMUs*Coreh -0.425 ***
( 0.143 )
Cores*NEW EMUh -0.306 **
( 0.130 )




Crises -0.135 -0.135 -0.135 -0.135
( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.109 )
Post crises 0.265 *** 0.265 *** 0.265 *** 0.265 ***
( 0.086 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.085 )
Controls: size, gravity and capital
mobility variables
Observations 45216 45216 45216 45216
Adjusted R2 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.709
Dependent variable:  log(FPE)
NEW EMU and Core NEW EMU and Periphery
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